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Abstract 
 
In the contemporary world, the existences of appropriate and effective legal, regulatory and 
institutional underpinnings are backbones for a given country’s sound corporate governance 
framework. Sound corporate governance framework in turn fosters market integrity, 
improves economic efficiency and growth as well as builds investor confidence. This 
dissertation critically analyzes whether the current Ethiopian share company law (part of the 
Commercial Code) envisaged such outcomes or not by using the six key minimum standards 
of OECD Principles of corporate governance as a template. It demonstrates how the legal and 
regulatory framework of the share company law provisions apparently has failed to create 
incentives for market players and also failed to promote transparent and efficient market. To 
smooth the progress of new investment and provide adequate investors’ protection, this 
dissertation recommends Ethiopia should revisit and update its share company law in light of 
the relevant OECD Principles by taking into account its own legal, economic and cultural 
circumstances.  
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Introduction 
The creation of companies in the modern legal form is a recent history in Ethiopian business 
practice. Traditionally, “small scale Greek, Armenian and Ethiopian stall keepers and 
itinerant peddlers” dominated the business practices of Ethiopia. However, through time the 
“Indians, Italians and Levant” wholesalers, distributors and merchandisers dominated this 
business practice by holding a massive range and quantity of commodities in towns. 
Consequently, these enterprising merchants and tradesmen were the basis for the creation of 
modern companies in Ethiopia.1 To regulate these modern companies, Ethiopia enacted the 
1931 Company and Bankruptcy Law.2 Nevertheless, the rapid growth of the sector in large 
scale and increased flow of foreign investment forced Ethiopia to enact a new commercial 
law. As a result, Ethiopia repealed the 1931 Company and Bankruptcy Law and enacted the 
1960 Commercial Code (hereafter the Commercial Code).3  
 
It modeled from the French Commercial Code and drafted by Professor Jean Escarra, a 
French legal scholar.4 The enactment of the commercial code facilitated the formation of 
several public and private companies in the country until 1974.5 However, the Derg 
Revolution (1974-1991) entirely suspended the commercial code and nationalized all 
incorporated companies by a series of Proclamations and Decrees.6 During this time, the 
formations of new companies were prohibited. The commercial code resumed in 1991 after 
the fall of the Derg Regime by the current government. Consequently, several public and 
private companies are being incorporated. Though, private limited companies are still the 
dominant business practice in Ethiopia, the formation of companies through the offering of 
shares to the public under the share company law provisions are dramatically increasing since 
2005.7 The share company law provisions are part of the Commercial Code under the heading 
of Business Organizations entitled “Companies Limited by Shares.”8 
 
                                                     
1 Minga Negash, ‘Rethinking Corporate Governance in Ethiopia’ (2008) Metropolitan State College of Denver 
Working Paper 8/2008, 4 <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1264697> last accessed 20 July 2012. 
2 Getahun Seifu, ‘Revisiting Company Law the Advent of Ethiopian Commodity Exchange’ (2010) 4(1) Mizan 
Law Review 102,103 
3Negarit Gazeta Gazette Extraordinary Commercial Code of the Emperor of Ethiopia Proclamation No 166 of 
1960(see recital three of number 3). 
4 Paul Brietzke, ‘Private Law in Ethiopia’ (1974), 18 (2) Journal of African Law 149, 163  
5 Negash n 1. 
6 Brietzke n 4. 
7 Fekadu Petros Gebremeskel, ‘Emerging Separation of Ownership and Control in Ethiopia Share Companies:  
Legal and Policy Implications’ (2010) 4(1) Mizan Law Review 1, 14.    
8 Commercial Code (n3) arts (304-509). 
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Despite the fact that the share company law has relevant provisions, it is apparently unable to 
create conducive legal and regulatory environments to the smooth running and ongoing 
operation of public companies. Its legal and regulatory frameworks are not properly 
articulated and failed to provide comprehensive legislative response to the modern 
complicated corporate governance issues of public companies.  
 
For instance, requirements to form or increase the company’s capital through issuing of 
equity/debt securities to the public are inadequate to protect potential investors.9 Similarly, to 
form a share company, it imposes a minimum of shareholder membership10 and capital 
requirement.11 These two provisions not only contravene current international standards and 
best practices but also discourage new investment and pools of capital resources. Its statutory 
frameworks also failed to provide adequate and clear allocation of powers to regulatory 
institutions. It neglected to require legislation of other enabling legal instruments like security 
laws and regulations.  
 
Correspondingly, the basic governance aspects of share company law provisions are defective 
and inadequate. Among others, the followings are the major loopholes and shortcomings. 
Restricting shareholders rights to transfer of their shares12 not only limits shareholders to 
exercise their ownership rights but also impedes liquidity of company’s shares in the capital 
markets. Imposing voting caps on shareholders at the company meetings13  contravenes “one 
share one vote principle.” Likewise, the provision that requires shareholders to deposit their 
shares prior to the meeting of shareholders prevents minority shareholders to sell their shares 
before the meetings.14 Further, allowing companies to issue bearer shares15 may contribute to 
the creation of anonymous ownerships. This in turn hampers company’s transparency and 
may lead to tax evasions and misappropriation of company’s assets by corporate insiders to 
the detriment of the company and minority shareholders. In addition, minority shareholders 
are not protected from abusive corporate insiders and in case of violation they have no rights 
to derivative suit against directors or challenge the decisions of controlling shareholders in 
                                                     
9 Commercial Code arts (317-322) and (468-469) respectively.   
10Commercial Code art307(1), even after the company formed and commenced its operation, the reduction of 
members blows the legal limits results in the winding up of the company (article 313).  
11Commercial Code art 306(1).    
12 Commercial Code art 333. 
13 Commercial Code art 408. 
14 Commercial Code art 401. 
15 Commercial Code art 325. 
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courts. There are no minimum mandatory and voluntary disclosure and transparency 
standards. The requirements of accounting and auditing standards do not comply with the 
international financial reporting standard and best practices.16 It also entirely disregarded the 
interests and roles of stakeholders within the company. Finally, the functions and 
responsibilities of boards and auditors in the company are also inadequate.  
 
The government of Ethiopia has already recognized the inadequacy of the entire commercial 
code provisions and drafted a new commercial code. However, the drafted commercial code 
was disregarded because of poorly drafted even before submitted to public comments. For 
this reason, the government of Ethiopia mandated the Ministry of Justice to draft another new 
commercial code. Thus, during the drafting of the new commercial code, the Drafting 
Committee should take into account the relevant OECD Principles of corporate governance17 
to facilitate the present business realities and to rectify the above mentioned defects.  
 
 This dissertation provides three main reasons why the OECD Principles are relevant to the 
Ethiopian corporate governance context. First, they obtained international acknowledgment 
as minimum standards and best practices for sound corporate governance framework.18 
Second, they are mainly developed to assist policy makers of both OECD and non OECD 
countries to formulate and ameliorate their legal, regulatory and institutional framework for 
proper corporate governance by taking into account their national economic, social and 
business practices.19 Third, they are not only non-prescriptive and outcomes oriented but also 
comprise common elements of all legal traditions and cultural circumstances of OECD and 
non OECD members, no matter how their economic developments and company’s ownership 
structures vary.20 Consequently, the dissertation argues that the supposed new draft 
commercial code should be scouted in lights of the relevant principles by taking into account 
the Ethiopian legal, regulatory and business practices. It also advocates consulting of the 
relevant principles as a reference during the drafting of share company law will have 
                                                     
16 Read commutatively Commercial Code arts 63, 446 and 448.  
17EOCD Principles of Corporate Governance (April 2004). Available at 
<http://www.oecd.org/home/0,3675,en_2649_201185_1_1_1_1_1,00.html> last accessed 15July 2012. 
18 ibid 11; Louis Bouchez, ‘Principles of Corporate Governance: the OECD Perspective’ (2007) 4(3) European 
Company Law 109.  
19 Ibid.  
20 Luka Cerioni, Corporate Governance: “The OECD Principles, the Scope for A “Model of the Successful 
Company”, and A New Challenge for the Company Law Agenda and the Broader Regulatory Agenda” (2008 
Brunel University Unpublished Paper) 2 <http://works.bepress.com/luca_cerioni/1 > last accessed 21July 2012; 
OECD Principles (n17) 13.  
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significant roles to establish sound corporate governance framework within the country. 
Establishing sound corporate governance framework in the country will in turn improve the 
financial soundness of the country, increases private investment and economic development.  
 
The rest of the dissertation is organized into three main parts. Part One briefly demonstrates 
the relevant share company law provisions. It discusses the legal and regulatory requirements 
to the creation of share companies. Then it presents the core corporate governance aspects of 
the share company law provisions. These include the basic rights of shareholders; protection 
of minority shareholders; rights of creditors, and duties and responsibilities of directors. Part 
Two presents the reason why the OECD Principles of corporate governance gained 
international recognition as benchmarks and best practices. It also discusses the relevancy of 
the principles to the Ethiopian corporate governance context. Then, it briefly discusses the 
minimum standards of the six core areas of OECD principles of good corporate governance. 
The Third Part is the main works of the dissertation. It critically analyzes the share company 
law provisions in light of the six minimum standards of OECD Principles of corporate 
governance. It also identifies the loopholes and drawbacks that should be rectified during the 
drafting of the new Commercial Code. Finally, Part Four of the dissertation will make 
concluding remarks and recommendations. 
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Part One 
General overviews of the Ethiopian Share Company Law 
In general, the share company law provisions comprise 205 articles and divided into eight 
chapters under the heading of Business Organizations sub titled “Companies Limited by 
Shares.” Chapter one and two set out the legal and procedural requirements for the formation 
of share companies (Articles 304-324). Chapter three and five provides for the issuance of 
shares and debt securities and the rights, and duties of share and debt holders (Articles 325-
346 and 429-461 respectively). Chapter four prescribes about company’s directors, auditors 
and meetings of shareholders (Articles 347-428). Chapter six provides how the accounts and 
books of the company should be held (Articles 445-461). Chapter seven lays down the 
requirements for the amendments of company’s statutes (Articles 462-494). The last chapter 
provides for the desolation and winding up of the company (articles 495-509). However, for 
convince, this dissertation will discuss the relevant provisions of share company law by 
dividing into the following structures. 
 
1.1 The Setting up Process and Formation of Share Company 
A share company’s capital is fixed in advance, allocated into equal nominal value of shares 
and its liabilities are limited to the assets of the company; consequently shareholders are 
liable to the extent of their contribution to the company.21 To form a share company, the 
initial capital and members should not be less than the minimum legal limits.22 It can be 
formed by two ways: by signing the memorandum of association and subscribing the whole 
capital among founders or by issuing and offering the prospectus to the public.23 In the first 
way, founders are required to prove in the company’s statutes that all shares are allocated and 
subscribed among members. One quarter of the subscribed capitals are paid up and deposited 
in bank. And if any, reports of members contributed in kind sworn in front of experts of the 
Ministry of Trade for the proper valuation of the property.24 In the second way, founders 
issued and offered prospectus to the public without any approval and registration by the 
Ministry. Then, they submit applicants’ subscriptions and resolutions passed at the 
                                                     
21 Commercial Code art 304. 
22  Commercial Code art 306 and 307(1). 
23 Commercial Code art 307 (2&3). 
24 Commercial Code arts (312-316). 
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subscribers meetings for registration.25 In both cases, liabilities of founders of the company 
failed to cover where the offered prospectus contained untrue or misleading statements or 
omitted relevant information.26 Lastly, the share company acquires the legal personality by 
depositing all necessary documents and registration in commercial registrar.27 
 
 Once the share company acquires legal personality, it issues shares to its subscribers. Shares 
can be issued either registered or unregistered bearer form and can be converted vise-versa 
per shareholders’ interests unless prohibited by law or company’s statutes.28 The contents and 
manner of registration of shares are stipulated under articles 330 and 331 of the commercial 
code. Based on the statutes of the company or agreements of the general meetings, the 
company may also issue various classes of shares which confer different rights; however it is 
prohibited to issue the same classes of shares which confer different rights.29 Among various 
classes of shares, preferred shares confer holders several priority rights over ordinary 
shareholders.30  
 
1.2 Regulatory and Supervisory Institution  
The share company law only provides regulatory and supervisory powers to the Ministry of 
Trade in the formation, ongoing functions and governance of companies.31 The Ministry has 
the following regulatory and supervisory powers on share companies. These are registering 
newly formed companies and depositing companies’ statutes and other periodical reports;32 
regulating crossholdings of shares among holding companies;33 reduce the remunerations of 
directors upon the application of shareholders not less 10% of the share capitals of the 
company34 and by its initiation or upon the application of shareholders, order to conduct 
investigations of the companies’ scandals and nominee shareholders.35  
  
                                                     
25 Commercial Code arts (317-322). 
26 Commercial Code arts (308-310).   
27 Commercial Code art 123. 
28 Commercial Code art 325 but the company cannot issue shares before its registration art 327.   
29 Commercial Code art 335. 
30 Commercial Code art 337. 
31 However Banks and Insurance Companies are regulated by National Banks of Ethiopia per article 5(7) of 
Proclamation to Amend National Bank of Ethiopia Establishment No. 591/2008. 
32 Commercial Code arts 90, 323 and 447. 
33 Commercial Code art 344. 
34 Commercial Code art 353(7) 
35 Commercial Code arts (318-387). 
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1.3 Basic Ownership Rights of Shareholders 
As owners of the company and separated from direct controls, shareholders have rights to 
exercise all inherent ownership rights provided by laws and companies statutes.36 They can 
exercise their rights either in persons or in absentia through proxies.37 This section describes 
the basic ownership rights of shareholders in the share company law provisions by classifying 
in to four categories.  
 
1.3.1 Right to Information 
Shareholders have the right to obtain all material and accurate information timely and 
regularly concerning the governance of the company prior to any meetings so that they can 
make informed decisions. In principle, share companies are required to publish the name, 
nature, capitals and head office of the company, the place, date and time of the meetings in 
the Official Commercial Newspaper and in the legal newspaper.38 However, when all the 
company’s shares are registered, information of meetings is sent to every shareholders 
address via post by registered letter at the expense of the company.39 Any registered 
shareholder has also the right to require the company to inform him of the meetings by 
registered letter at his own expense.40 Notification of the meetings should not be less than 
fifteen full days for the first meetings and eight full days for subsequent meetings in case 
where the first meeting failed to hold for lack of quorum.41 Interested shareholders have also 
the right to inspect company’s documents at head office before the meetings prescribed under 
articles 406, 417, 422 and 427 of the commercial code. 
 
1.3.2 Rights to Participate and Vote at the Shareholders Meetings 
The share company law provides shareholders rights to participate and vote in shareholders 
meetings. In principle, every share carries one vote;42 however, there are exceptions to this 
principle. Companies are not allowed to vote on its redeemed shares.43 The statutes of the 
                                                     
36 Commercial Code art 389(2). 
37 Commercial Code art 398. 
38 Commercial Code arts392 (1) and 396. 
39 Commercial Code art 392(2). 
40 Commercial Code art 392(3).  
41 Commercial Code art 395. 
42 Commercial Code art 407. 
43 Commercial Code art 400. 
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company may also limit the number of voting rights of shareholders.44 Shareholders may not 
vote when their interests conflict with company. Directors are also not permitted to vote on 
resolutions concerning with their duties and liabilities.45 The memorandum of association 
may limit holders of preferred shares to vote only matters on extraordinary meetings.46  
 
Subject to these exceptions, shareholders have the following voting rights in the shareholders 
meetings. At the ordinary general meetings they, have the right to participate and approve or 
reject directors and auditors’ report on the balance sheet, the profit and loss accounts, and 
decided the allocation of dividends.47 They appoint or remove directors and auditors, 
determine the amount of their remunerations, approve the issuance of debt securities along 
with guaranties attached thereto, and after discussion they may amend the accounts of the 
company.48 They also authorize or prohibit directors to be partner with joint and several 
liabilities in competitor companies or to compete against the company on their own behalf or 
third parties.49 They vote and take the necessary action on director’s direct or indirect 
business transactions with the company approved by boards.50 They pass a resolution to 
institute proceedings against directors whether such issue was on the agenda or not.51 
Shareholders have also the right to participate in extraordinary meetings to amend the 
companies’ statutes.52 Similarly, holders of classes of shares have the right to approve or 
reject resolutions passed by general meetings relating to the modification of their classes of 
shares.53  
 
1.3.3 Right to Share the Profits/ Proceeds of the Company 
Subject to statutes of the company, shareholders have inherent right to participate in the 
annual net profit or distribution of the proceeds of the company upon dissolution in 
proportion to their shares.54 Shareholders may also obtain fixed or interim interest even 
without profit during company’s preparatory works and construction provided that the 
                                                     
44 Commercial Code art 408. 
45 Commercial Code art 409(1 &3). 
46 Commercial Code art 336(3). 
47 Commercial Code arts 419(1), 347(1), 350(2), 351(1), 354, 368(1), 369(1&2) and 371.  
48 Commercial Code arts 419(2), 353(1) and 372. 
49 Commercial Code art 355. 
50 Commercial Code art 356.  
51 Commercial Code art 365(1). 
52 Commercial Code art (423-425).   
53 Commercial Code art 426. 
54 Commercial Code art 345(1&2) and 458. 
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articles of association authorized and fixed the date of cease of such interest payments.55 
They have also preferential right to subscribe new shares in proportion to their number of 
shareholdings.56 
 
1.3.4 The Right to Transfer of Shares or Withdraw from the Company 
On one hand, the share company law prescribes shareholders rights to free transfer of shares 
may be restricted by the articles of association or by resolution of an extraordinary meetings; 
as well as assignment of shares may also be subject to prior approval of directors.57 On the 
other hand, it provides shareholders right to withdraw from the company with the redemption 
of their shares at average prices on stock exchange or at the price proportionate to the assets 
of the company when they dissent on the resolutions relating to any changes in the nature, 
objects of the company or the transfer of head office to abroad.58  
 
1.4 Rights of Minority and Foreign Shareholders 
In case where there are several groups of shareholders having different legal status in the 
share company as per article 336 of the commercial code, each group of shareholders have 
the right to vote and be represented at least by one board of director.59 Correspondingly, 
shareholders representing 20% of the capital of the company have the right to elect one 
auditor under article 368(2) of the commercial code. Moreover, shareholders representing 
10% of the share capitals of the company have two rights. First, they have the right to request 
the court to be called the general shareholders meetings. Second, they have the right to 
petition to the Ministry of Trade to appoint examiners to investigate and report the scandals 
of the company; hence the Ministry may require guarantees from petitioners the expenses of 
the investigations.60 Conversely, minority shareholders are not permitted to institute 
proceedings against directors where one fifth of the capitals of the company vote against the 
resolution.61 Although, foreign shareholders are not restricted to exercise their inherent rights 
                                                     
55 Commercial Code art 457. 
56 Commercial Code art 470. 
57 Commercial Code art 333.  
58 Commercial Code art 463. 
59 Commercial Code art 352.  
60 Commercial Code art 381 and 391(2).   
61 Commercial Code art 365(3). 
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once they become shareholders, at the first place companies may discriminate by issuing 
shares which are not transferable to foreigners.62 
  
1.5 Issuance of Debt Securities and Rights of Creditors     
To issue debt securities, companies are required to demonstrate that their capitals are fully 
paid-up and their first year balance sheets are issued.63 The contents of the debt security 
issued by the companies are prescribed under article 433(a-h) of the Commercial Code. 
Companies are also only allowed to issue debt securities to the extent of their paid-up capitals 
indicated in the last approved balance sheets. However, the amount may exceed the paid-up 
capitals where they mortgaged their immovable properties and the issued debentures do not 
exceed two third of the value of the mortgage or the exceeded amounts are guaranteed by 
registered securities or by government/public authorities.64 Like the issuance of shares, debt 
securities can be issued either in bearer or registered form with different classes that entitle 
holders various legal rights.65  
 
As creditors of the company, debenture holders have the right to engage and vote at meetings 
called by their agents, company’s directors or at least 20% of the same classes of debenture 
holders.66 At the meetings, they may discuss and pass resolutions to enforce their loan 
agreements.67 The meeting may also approve or reject the debtor company’s proposals 
relating to the modification of the structure of the company; merger with another company; 
on matters of creditors having preferential right over the existing loans and proposals related 
to the variation of the terms of the loan agreements.68 For legal effects, resolutions passed by 
debenture holders should be presented in the court for confirmation.69 Finally, debenture 
holders may elect and represented by one or more agents for the effective exercise of their 
rights on the debtor company.70    
 
                                                     
62 Commercial Code art 330(f). 
63 Commercial Code art 429.  
64 Commercial Code art 432.  
65 Commercial Code art 434. 
66 Commercial Code art 436. 
67 Commercial Code art 437. 
68 Commercial Code art 438. 
69 Commercial Code art 441.  
70 Commercial Code arts (442-444). 
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1.6  Duties and Responsibilities of Directors and Auditors 
 
Since companies are legal persons and separated from shareholders control, they are directed 
by a board of directors elected by the general assemble of shareholders. In the share company 
law companies’ managements are composed of directors, general manager and secretary.71 
The first boards of directors are appointed by the statutes of the companies and approved by 
meetings of subscribers for three years. The subsequent directors are elected or removed by 
shareholders general assembly and they are legible for re-election unless prohibited by 
company’s statutes.72 The members of directors must range from 3-12, and all are required 
not only be shareholders of the company but also deposit their shares fixed in the 
memorandum of association until they left powers.73 Boards of directors elect the chairman, 
general manager and secretary. Nevertheless, the general manager is an employee of the 
company and may not be members of the boards except the articles of association required 
directors should be managers of the company.74  
 
Directors have the core responsibilities of preparing management and meeting minutes; 
keeping accounts and books as per articles 445-447 of the Commercial Code; submitting 
directors’ remuneration to shareholders for approval;75 convene meetings of shareholders; set 
reserve funds required by law and statutes; apply to the court in case where the company 
failed to pay its debts.76 Moreover, they have the duty to act with due care and diligence in 
their overall directing of the company as powers given by the law, company’s statutes and 
decisions made by the general shareholders meetings.77 Decision of directors require absolute 
majority and they may not take any decision unless majority of them are present or 
represented.78  
 
To avoid conflict of interests between the company and directors, it provides two types of 
provisions: prohibited and regulated transactions. In one hand, directors are not allowed to 
loan agreements with the company nor to be partners with joint and several liabilities in 
compotator companies or contend against the company directly or indirectly; on the other 
                                                     
71 Commercial Code art 348. 
72 Commercial Code arts 350 and 354. 
73 Commercial Code art 347 and 349. 
74 Commercial Code art 348 and 363(2). 
75 Commercial Code art 361. 
76 Commercial Code art 362. 
77 Commercial Code arts 363 and 364.  
78 Commercial Code art 358. 
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hand, a director may make transactions with the company with the prior approval of boards.79  
Finally, directors’ remuneration is determined by shareholders meetings and company’s 
statutes.80 
 
The appointment, remuneration and removal of auditors are similar to directors.81 
Nevertheless, persons mentioned in article 370(1) and (2) of the commercial code are not 
eligible to be auditors of the company. The major responsibilities of auditors are auditing the 
company’s account, certifying and preparing reports which are submitted to shareholders 
general assembly;82 inform to shareholders or public prosecutors for directors’ breach of legal 
and statutory obligations;83 convening shareholders meetings in directors’ failure.84 Finally, 
auditors will be liable both civil and criminally if they failed to observe their obligations as 
per article 380 of the commercial code.  
 
For the third part analysis, the second part of this dissertation will discuss the six minimum 
standards of OECD Principles of corporate governance and its relevance to the Ethiopian 
context. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
79 Commercial Code arts 355-35. 
80 Commercial Code art 353.   
81 Commercial Code arts 368, 369, 371 and 372. 
82 Commercial Code arts 374 and 375.  
83 Commercial Code art 376. 
84  Commercial Code art 277. 
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Part Two 
OECD Principles of Corporate Governance 
 
The OECD Principles were first agreed and issued by OECD member states in 1999 after the 
occurrence of 1997 Asian financial crisis.85 To address the concerns of the newly developing 
markets and corporate governance failures, the principles have been revised in 2004. They 
incorporated inputs obtained from consultations of five Regional Corporate Governance 
Roundtables and additional special meetings of 43 non OECD and developing countries.86 
Accordingly, the principles reflected the concern and experience of both the OECD and non 
OECD members including developing countries. They are designed to provide a specific 
guidance for policy makers, regulators and market players in their endeavor to improve their 
legal, regulatory and institutional framework for sound corporate governance.87 They are also 
nonbinding standards, principle based and an outcome oriented. Consequently, they can be 
benchmarked and adapted whether or not a given country’s legal framework is common or 
civil law and irrespective of the company’s ownership structures and level of economic 
development. All these make the principles internationally accepted benchmarks and best 
practices for sound corporate governance.88 Thus, the principles have relevancy to improve 
share companies’ corporate governance in Ethiopia.  
 
2.1 OECD Principles of Corporate Governance as International Benchmark 
 
The initiatives of OECD member states are at the forefront in the global movement towards 
the setting of minimum standards of good corporate governance framework.89 Currently, the 
principles gained international acceptance and have been approved by different international 
organizations. The Financial Stability Forum adopted the principles for its “Twelve Key 
Standards for Sound financial System.” The principles provide the basis for cooperation 
between OECD and non OECD countries.  They also form the basis for “World Bank/IMF” 
                                                     
85 OECD Principles (n17) 9. 
86 Fianna Jesover and Grant Kirkpatrick, ‘The Revised OECD Principles of Corporate governance their 
Relevance to non OECD Countries’ (2005) 3. Available at<http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/41/38/33977036.pdf> 
 last accessed on 12July 2012. 
87 Policy Brief: The OECD Principles of Corporate Governance (2004) 1. Available at 
<http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/41/32/33647763.pdf >last accessed 10July 2012. 
88 Grant Kirkpatrick, ‘Improving Corporate Governance Standards: the Work of the EOCD and the Principles’ 
(2004) 1. Available at< http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/45/24/33655111.pdf > last accessed 20 July 2012. 
89 Thomas Clarke, International Corporate Governance: A Comparative Approach (Routledge 2007)243. 
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review of countries corporate governance framework based on “Reports on Observance of 
Standards and Codes (ROSC).”90 In this regard, in 2007 the World Bank reviewed the 
Ethiopian accounting and auditing standards and recommended for the revision of the 
commercial code provisions.91 Hence, revisiting and updating the Ethiopian share company 
law provisions in light of the OECD Principles not only helps the country to comply with the 
World Bank/IMF review standards but also facilitates its application acceptance to WTO 
accession. Finally, the Banks of International Settlements (BIS) and International 
Associations of Insurance Supervisors also recognized the principles.92 The principles 
covered six key areas of good corporate governance. Hence, part two of the dissertation 
briefly discusses the minimum standards of the principles one by one with reference to their 
relevant annotations.   
 
2.2 Ensuring the Basis for an Effective Corporate Governance Framework  
 
 The first areas of the principles are added in the 2004 review. The principles advocate 
corporate governance framework which comprises legal, regulatory and institutional 
underpinnings should promote transparent and efficient markets, be consistent with the rule 
of law and clearly allocate powers among supervisory and regulatory institutions.93 
Consequently, the principles recommended policy makers to formulate an adequate and 
comprehensive legislative response. The formulated laws and regulations should have the 
overall economic impact and foster market integrity which meets the new market 
development and creates incentive to different market players. In doing so, the principles 
suggested to emphasize on ultimate economic outcomes and assess all alternative policy 
options that shape the proper functioning of markets. In other words, the newly designed 
corporate law and regulation should not only be cost effective and enforceable equitably with 
all market players but also avoid contradictory and overlapping provisions or regulatory gaps. 
The designed laws and regulations should also be supplemented by voluntary codes and 
standards provided with clear articulation of their status in scope and applications.  
                                                     
90 Christine A. Mallin, Corporate Governance (2nd edn, Oxford University Press2007) 33.    
91 ROSC: Reports on Observance of Standards and Codes Ethiopia (Commissioned Report 2007). Available at 
<http://www.worldbank.org/ifa/rosc_aa_ethiopia.pdf> last accessed on 21 July 2012.  
92 Bouchez (n18) 110. 
93  OECD Principles I. 
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In general, the principles advocate that the legal, regulatory and institutional framework of a 
country that shapes the corporate governance of companies should be adjusted with the new 
developments of markets.94   
 
2.3 The Rights of Shareholders and Key Ownership Functions 
 
The second areas of the principles insist on an inherent ownership rights of shareholders 
should be promoted and protected by corporate governance framework.95 Shareholders 
inherent rights include secured ownership registration, free transfer of shares, obtain all 
material and reliable information timely and regularly, participate and vote at shareholders 
meetings and partake in dividends.96 In case where boards proposed to modify the company’s 
statutes or subscriptions of new shares or extraordinary transactions of the company’s assets, 
the principles recommend shareholders should be fully informed and actively participate 
before passing such resolutions.97 Hence, prior to the meetings, shareholders should be fully 
and timely informed the voting procedures, dates, location, agenda and the issues to be 
decided.  During the meetings, shareholders should have the opportunity to ask questions, put 
in place issues on the agenda and propose resolutions with certain limitations. They should 
have the right to nominate and elect boards, express their opinions on boards and key 
executives remuneration and approve when the compensation are equity based.98  
    
The principle also advocates the company’s pyramid structures, cross shareholdings and 
shares with limited or multiple voting rights that allow shareholders certain level of control 
disproportion to their shareholdings must to be disclosed.99 The principles further state that 
market mechanisms for corporate controls should be permitted. However, the rules and 
procedures governing corporate holdings, mergers and sales of considerable portions of 
company’s assets must be revealed to investors so that they can understand their rights and 
duties. The prices of such transaction should be also faire enough that protects the interests of 
all classes of shareholders.100 In such cases, boards and managements anti takeover 
                                                     
94 Policy Brief: (n85) 2. 
95 OECD Principles II. 
96 OECD Principles II, A  
97 OECD Principle II, B. 
98 OECD Principle II, C. 
99 OECD Principle II, D.   
100 OECD Principle II, E.  
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mechanisms to avoid their accountability to shareholders and the company should be 
prohibited. Moreover, the principles recommend that institutional investors’ exercising of 
ownership rights should be promoted. Nevertheless, while performing in fiduciary capacity, 
they should disclose their corporate governance, voting policies and procedures, and how 
conflicts of interests are being managed.101 Finally, the principles insist shareholders should 
be allowed to discuss with each other on matters concerning with their fundamental 
ownership rights unless engaged for abusive purpose.102  
 
2.4  The Equitable Treatment of Shareholders 
 
The third areas of the principles state that the corporate governance framework should 
equitably treat all shareholders’ rights, including minority and foreign shareholders, and in 
case of violation they should have the right to obtain effective remedies.103 Treating 
shareholders equitably builds investors confidence because they understand that their 
investments within the companies are protected from misuse by corporate insiders. 
Consequently, the principles recommended both ex-ante and ex-post rights of shareholders. 
Ex-ante rights includes:-  
a) preemptive rights to subscribe new shares;  
b) qualified majority on certain shareholders resolutions;  
c) use of cumulative voting on the board members election;  
d) right to information all the series and classes of shares before their acquisitions; and 
e)  requirements of prior approval if subsequent changes are made on voting rights 
attached to those classes of shares.104  
Moreover, it calls for custodian and nominees of shares should be permitted to cast votes on 
behalf of their beneficiaries upon the agreed manners and barriers of cross border voting 
should be avoided. In this regard rules and procedures to convene meetings of shareholders 
are required to be equitable to all shareholders and any obstacles or expensive costs to cast 
votes should be eliminated. It also strongly advocates that minority shareholders should be 
protected from abusive behaviors of insiders trading and abusive self-dealings, including 
                                                     
101 OECD Principle II, F. 
102 OECD Principle II, G. 
103 OECD Principle III. 
104 OECD Principle III, A. 
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controlling shareholders transaction with the company.105 Similarly, any transactions made by 
board members and executives directly, indirectly or on behalf of third parties are required to 
be prior approval of boards.106 In case of violation of these basic ownership rights, the 
principle maintains minority shareholders ex-post right to institute derivative or class actions 
unless such rights are abused.  
 
2.5 The Roles of Stakeholders in Corporate Governance 
 
The four areas of the principles urge that corporate governance frameworks should address 
the concerns of stakeholders provided by laws or contractual agreements. It should also 
facilitate strong relationships between companies and stakeholders in producing wealth, jobs 
and the long-term sustainability of companies’ capital resources.107 The principles dictate that 
the long term sustainability of companies depends on the outcomes of teamwork that 
integrates different resource providers inter alia investors, employees, creditors and suppliers. 
They also assert that the rights of these stakeholders provided by the law or contractual 
agreement should not only be respected but also in case of violations they should be fully 
compensated.108 They further suggested employees’ engagement in corporate governance 
should be permitted; however, their degree of engagement may be varied. It may be in board 
members representation, representation by the workers council to express their concerns on 
certain key governance decisions or partake in equity ownership plans or share profit 
depending on national laws and companies corporate governance structures.109 Once 
stakeholders are allowed to engage in the governance of the company, they should obtain full 
and material information timely and regularly for the accomplishment of their 
responsibilities.110 Moreover, to tackle unethical conducts and illegal practices within the 
company, stakeholders and their representatives should be allowed to freely communicate 
such practices to the boards and their rights should not be affected as a result.111 Finally, the 
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principle urges corporate laws and regulations should be backed by efficient and effective 
contract and insolvency laws with robust enforcement of creditors’ rights.112 
 
2.6  Disclosure and Transparency 
 
These areas of the principles states corporate governance frameworks should assure that the 
disclosure of information is made timely and accurately on all relevant issues regarding 
internal governance of the company inter alia, financial performance and results, ownership 
structure and corporate governance.113 Companies’ disclosure and transparency is crucial for 
shareholders to exercise their ownership rights and for regulators to detect and fix unethical 
and illegal practices within companies. However, disclosure standards should not be unduly 
burdensome to companies or jeopardize their competitive position in the market. For this 
reason, the principles recommend disclosure should incorporate but not limited with the 
following information. The financial and operation results (the balance sheet, profit and loss 
accounts and the cash flow statements); objectives of the company; major ownership 
structures and voting rights; boards and senior managements remuneration policy; boards 
selection process, qualification, their independence and directorship to other company; 
related parties transactions; matters on employees and stakeholders; corporate governance 
structures; procedures and policies, and how they are implemented.114 The principles stress 
that the disclosed information should be not only prepared in “accordance with high quality 
financial and non financial accounting standards” but also audited by independent, competent 
and qualified external auditors.115 Here, external auditors are accountable to shareholders and 
the company, and owed fiduciary duties to their auditing professions.116 It also advocates that 
the means of disseminating the prepared information should be equitable to all users in time 
and cost effective to access.117 Finally, the principle calls for the disclosed information should 
be backed by analysts, brokers and rating agencies for better investors’ decision making. 
However, their services should be regulated to manage material conflicts of interests with the 
company.118  
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2.7 Boards Responsibilities  
 
The last areas of the principles calls for boards to strategically direct the company, effectively 
supervise managements and accountable to shareholders and the company.119 In guiding the 
company and overseeing the managements, boards’ structures and compositions may range 
from executive and non executive boards to supervisory and management boards or 
additional statutory boards for auditing roles. Accordingly, the principles are designed to 
apply to all board structures and advocate boards should perform “in a fully informed basis, 
in good faith, with due diligence and care,” and in the best interest of the company and 
shareholders.120 This requirement imposes two fiduciary duties on the boards: the “duty of 
care and duty of loyalty.” The “duty of care” requires boards strategically guiding of the 
company and overseeing of the management. Conversely, the “duty of loyalty” requires 
boards’ interests to pursue and their stewardship towards the shareholders and the company.  
 
To implement the “duty of care and loyalty” the principles recommended boards should 
handle all classes of shareholders in an evenhanded manner when their judgments affect 
those classes of shareholders differently.121 In addition, they are required to apply high 
standards of codes of conduct and consider the interest of company’s stakeholders.122 The 
principle lists the core functions of boards that are required to insure:- 
a) compliance of laws and standards;  
b) the overseeing of internal control systems for financial reporting; 
c) monitoring and controlling of conflicts of interests;  
d) proper board members nomination and voting process;  
e) the alignment of senior managements and boards remuneration with the long term 
interest of shareholders and the company; and 
f) monitoring companies’ transparency and disclosure.123  
To implement these core functions, the principle urges boards to apply objective and 
independent judgments.124 For boards’ objective and independent judgments, they are 
required to assign non executive board members. Their responsibilities are to insure the 
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integrity of financial and non financial reporting systems; evaluate related party transactions; 
nominate board members and senior managements and determine their remuneration. In case 
where board committees are organized, their mandate, composition and working procedures 
should be clearly articulated and disclosed to shareholders. And each member of the boards is 
required to demonstrate their commitments to the responsibilities entrusted to them. For their 
collective and overall responsibilities, boards are required to access accurate, material and 
timely information before making any decisions.125  
The above two parts briefly discussed the Ethiopian share company law provisions in part 
one and the standards of OECD Principles of corporate governance in part two. Then, part 
three will critically analyze the share company law provisions in light of the standards of 
OECD Principles. 
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Part Three 
Revisiting and Updating the Ethiopian Share Company Law 
Provisions in Light of OECD Principles of Corporate Governance 
 
This part of the dissertation critically analyzes the share company law provisions discussed in 
part one in light of the OECD Principles discussed in part two. For convenience, it organizes 
and analyzes the share company law provisions corresponding with the structures of OECD 
Principles. This part also identifies and demonstrates the loopholes and drawbacks of the 
share company law provisions that should be revisited and updated in light of the relevant 
OECD Principles of corporate governance.    
 
3.1 Enhancing the Legal and Regulatory Framework 
 
As discussed previously, the OECD Principles urge government policy makers should craft 
their legal, regulatory and institutional bases that ensure the effective and efficient corporate 
governance framework. It should foster market integrity and create incentives to different 
market players. The principles suggested three prerequisites for effective corporate 
governance framework. First, it should integrate effective corporate laws, regulations and 
voluntary codes and standards. Second, it should avoid overregulation and regulatory 
vacuum, as well as be to cost effective, equitably enforceable to all market players. Third, it 
should be supplemented by clearly allocated regulatory and supervisory powers with robust 
implementing institutions.  
 
Nonetheless, as noted in part one, the legal frameworks of some share company law 
provisions apparently failed to create incentives to market players and also failed to 
encourage transparent and efficient markets. To demonstrate these, the provisions requiring 
minimum capitals and memberships for the formation of share companies are inappropriate 
and unnecessary.126 These requirements not only discourage new pools of resources and 
investments but also contravene international best practices. Currently, several countries have 
abolished minimum capital requirement for two reasons.127 First, it is blurred and confusing 
                                                     
126 Commercial Code arts 306(1) and 307(1).  
127 USID: ‘Ethiopian Commercial Law & Institutional Reforms and Trade Diagnosis’ (January 2007) 31. 
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because capital requirements are prone to accounting manipulation. Second, such provision 
neither protects shareholders nor creditors in the first place. Similarly, minimum shareholding 
requirement has two shortcomings. On one hand, it creates obstacles to form new share 
companies by less than the legal limits. On the other hand, it compels incorporated companies 
to winding up by the fact that company’s shareholder memberships are less than the legal 
limits.128 However, in practice companies may have less than the legal limit shareholders but 
may have several wholly owned subsidiary companies. Therefore, compelling to wind up 
such companies by mere reason of the reduction of membership to the legal limits is clearly 
unfeasible to the modern realities of corporate structures. 
  
Second, the share company provisions have loopholes in the requirements of initial offering 
of shares to the public. The requirements of the initial offering of shares to the public 
provided from articles 317-323 of the Commercial Code are defective and inadequate. First, 
the contents of the prospectus under article 318 do not require an audit opinions of the 
financial information incorporated in the prospectus. Second, there are no requirements for 
approval and registration of the draft prospectus by regulatory authority before issued and 
offered to the public.129 In addition, the offering of additional new shares in article 469(5) or 
debt securities provided in articles 429-433 of the commercial failed to require financial 
reports to be prepared based on established accounting and auditing standards and audited by 
independent auditor.130 It also neglected to clearly articulate the liabilities of founders/issuers 
where the offered prospectus to the public contained untrue or misleading statements or 
omitted the relevant information for investors’ investment decisions. All these legal and 
regulatory loopholes of the share company law provisions will have potential impacts on 
investors’ investment decisions. This in turn not only creates loss of investors’ confidence in 
the Ethiopian capital markets but also results in market inefficiency, raises the cost of capitals 
and inefficient use of scarce resources in the country.  
 
Third, the share company law provisions are not supplemented by other legislation. Including 
security laws, regulations, and voluntary codes and listing standards. Only two sets of laws 
regulating banking and insurance companies exist.131 For this reason, there are no stock 
                                                     
128 Commercial Code art 311. 
129 ROSC: (n91) 16. 
130 Commercial Code art 469(5).  
131 A Proclamation to Approve Business Banking Proclamation No. 592/2008 and A proclamation to Provide for 
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exchanges or alternative trading systems for trading of shares in the capital markets.132 
Hence, in Ethiopia company shares can be only traded by direct dealings between the 
shareholders and investors or informal contacts between the company and investors.133 
Therefore, the legal and regulatory frameworks should allow the establishments of organized 
stock exchanges and alternative trading systems by considering the country’s business 
culture. The establishment of stock markets will have crucial roles for the existence of strong 
capital markets in Ethiopia. They will serve as markets organizer (companies share liquidity), 
information distributors (between investors and issuers), standard setters (setting the listing 
standards for companies), regulators (regulating their members based on sated standards) and 
as business compotators.134 
 
Forth, the share company law provides regulatory and supervisory powers solely to the 
Ministry of Trade. It also failed to mandate sufficient powers to the Ministry for regulating 
public companies from their incorporation to ongoing operations and corporate governance. 
The Ministry has very limited regulatory powers: registering and receiving companies’ 
reports; regulating share transfers between holding companies; reducing boards’ 
remuneration and ordering investigation of companies’ scandals based on shareholders 
petition.135 The Ministry’s supervisory roles are almost omitted in the provisions. Even after 
the finding of the investigation of companies’ scandals, there is no provision that allows the 
Ministry to take appropriate disciplinary action on failure companies. This regulatory 
framework is inadequate to protect investors and to avoid market inefficiencies.  
 
Above all, the analyses demonstrated that the Ethiopian legal, regulatory and institutional 
framework is flawed to provide incentives to market players and failed to foster market 
integrity and promote effective and efficient corporate governance.  
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3.2 Strengthening the Basic Rights of Shareholders 
 
Generally, in part one the discussion on the share company law provisions show the basic 
rights of shareholders. These are: - right to ownership registrations, right to information, right 
to pare take and vote in the meetings of shareholders, right to transfer or sale shares and 
participate in the profits or proceeds of the company.  These ownership rights of shareholders 
are similar to the OECD Principles discussed in part two. However, except the rights to share 
the profits of the company, the other basic ownership rights of shareholders are not properly 
articulated. Thus, this section analyzes each of the basic shareholders rights on by one in light 
of the corresponding OECD Principles.  
 
Registrations of ownership rights in the share company law provisions are two types: 
registered and unregistered ownership rights.136 In case where the company’s shares are 
bearer they are not registered and holders of bearer shares will not have secured ownership 
rights as advocated by OECD Principle II (B). Thus, any holders of bearer shares in bona fide 
may exercise the ownership right no matter how he/she obtained from illegal holders.137 
Further, allowing companies to issue bearer and unregistered shares may contribute the 
concentration of anonymous ownership within the company. This in turn will have two 
drawbacks. Firstly, it hampers company’s transparency by creating opaque companies 
structures. Secondly, it leads to tax evasion and misuse of the company’s assets by corporate 
insiders to the detriment of minority shareholders and the company. Even to participate in 
shareholders meeting and exercise voting rights, holders of bearer shares are compelled to 
deposit their shares in the company before meetings of shareholders.138    
 
Information rights are another main tool for shareholders to make informed decisions in 
shareholders meeting. However, as noted in part one of the share company law provisions, 
the modes, materiality and accuracy of information disclosed to shareholders meeting are 
deficient and inadequate. The methods of disclosure prescribed in article 392 are inadequate 
and in terms of cost effectiveness they are burdensome for the company. Correspondingly, 
the means of an accessing company’s information provided under articles 392(3), 406, 417, 
422 and 427 of the commercial code are expensive for shareholders; rather it should be 
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supplemented by requiring companies to publish full and material information in their 
company’s website, public media and send to each shareholder via e-mails. The share 
company law also failed to requires the disclosure of relevant information inter alia, voting 
procedures, the agenda of the meeting and the issues to be decided at the meetings.139 
Especially when the board plan to alter the basic structures of the company such as 
amendments of companies’ statutes, issuance of additional equity/debt securities or 
extraordinary transactions of the company’s assets, full and timely disclosure of such 
information is not explicitly provided. Unless shareholders are fully informed the voting 
procedures, the agenda of the meeting and the issues to be decided at the meeting, it is hardly 
possible for them to make informed decisions at meetings of shareholders.  
 
Shareholders voting rights are the main tools for shareholders to influence the company by 
participating and voting in the meetings of shareholders. As pointed out in part one, 
shareholders are entitled to appoint/remove directors and auditors; determine the amount of 
directors’ remuneration and review their transactions with the company; pass resolutions to 
institute proceedings against liable directors; vote on the amendments of company’s statutes 
and approve the changes made on classes of shares by class holders. However, some 
prerequisites for shareholders to make better decisions in the meetings are not provided. 
These includes, allowing shareholders the right to ask questions, to put in place issues in the 
agendas and with certain limitations propose resolutions in the meetings.140Similarly, it 
cannot provide shareholders the base to participate in the board nomination process before 
election. This enables shareholders to identify the qualified and appropriate board nominees.  
It also failed to include their voting rights to via emails in absentia.141  
 
The share company law provisions also impose several voting caps that limit shareholders 
voting rights irrespective of their shareholdings in the company contrary to “one share one 
vote rules”.142 In fact, several European countries corporate laws adopt such voting restriction 
rules as opposed to United States “one share one vote rules.”143 Since the commercial code of 
Ethiopia patterned from the French commercial code, it imposes several voting caps on 
                                                     
139 Commercial Code art 396; OECD Principle II B (1). 
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shareholders.  In this case, the OECD Principles neither take the position of “one share one 
vote rules” nor voting caps.144 Nevertheless, two drastic disadvantages are identified in 
provisions that restrict the number of voting rights in shareholders’ meetings. First, they 
diminish and redistribute shareholders control ownership over the company in proportion to 
their investments. Second, they hamper their incentives to pare take in the meetings of 
shareholders.145  
 
Before shareholders pass resolutions, the share company law failed to require full disclosure 
of the rules and procedures governing the holdings of corporate assets in the capital markets 
inter alia, mergers and extraordinary transactions. Such transactions play pivotal roles in the 
capital markets where they are fully disclosed to investors, executed in transparent and 
efficient manner and their prices are aligned with the interest of all classes of shareholders. 
Institutional investors under articles 328 and 398(2) of the commercial code have voting 
rights through proxies. However, they may not vote in fiduciary capacity where their interests 
are in conflict with the company as per article 409(1) of the commercial code. On the other 
hand, the OECD Principles promote institutional investors to vote in meetings of 
shareholders with the preconditions of disclosing their corporate governance, voting policies 
and procedures, and how their conflicts of interests are being managed.146  
 
Another basic ownership right of shareholders is the right to transfer/sale of shares or 
withdraws from the company. Free transferability or trading of shares in open or organized 
stock exchanges is the main distinct features of public companies. Free transfer of share 
facilitates the liquidity of public companies shares, so that investors can easily buy and sell 
shares in the capital markets. Contrary to this rule, article 333 of the commercial code allows 
the company’s statutes or resolutions of extraordinary meetings not only restrict the free 
transfers of sharers but also subject assignment of shares to approvals of boards. These 
restrictions will have two drastic shortcomings. First, it limits shareholders exercise of their 
key ownership rights. Second, it impedes liquidity of the company’s shares in the capital 
markets. Hence, the existence of this provision in the share company law is unfeasible with 
the distinct features of public companies.  
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Shareholders rights to withdraw or exit is provided under article 463 of the commercial code 
in cases where any changes are made in the nature or objects of the company or the 
company’s head office are transferred in abroad. Likewise, such rights are permitted in a 
narrow circumstance in others corporate laws on the assumption that greater numbers of 
shareholders exit may affect the capital integrity of the company.147 However, once the share 
company law allows shareholders rights to exit from the company, establishing stock 
exchanges and prescribing mandatory takeover bid provisions are very essential to guarantee 
shareholders full redress of their investments.  
 
3.3 Improving the Equitable Treatments of Shareholders and Protections of Minority 
Shareholders  
 
There are instances where boards, managements and controlling shareholders may participate 
in activities that adversely affect the interests of the company and minority shareholders. 
Thus, the principle of boards’ fairness is crucial in corporate governance. It requires boards 
and corporate managers to equitably treat all shareholders and protect companies’ assets 
against misuse by corporate insiders.148  
 
As illustrated in part one, the share company law prescribe some relevant provisions 
regarding the equitable treatments and protection of minority shareholders. The same series 
and classes of shareholders have the same rights and any subsequent changes require prior 
approval by class holders.149 Shareholders have right to subscribe additional new shares.150  
They have the right to qualified majority or unanimous vote on amendments of the 
company’s statues.151 They have the right to withdraw from the company subject to 
prescribed preconditions.152 Shareholders representing 10% of the share capitals of the 
company have also the right to call shareholders general meetings pursuant to article 391(2) 
of the commercial code. Groups of shareholders having different legal status have the right to 
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elect at least one representative as a board member153 and shareholders having 20% of share 
capitals of the company have also the right to appoint one auditor.154  
The last two share company law provisions are called cumulative voting systems. They assist 
minority shareholders to strengthen their voice within the company by electing their 
representatives in board members and auditor proportion to their shareholdings.155 These are 
exceptions to ordinary voting systems which confer controlled shareholders to elect the whole 
board members and auditors.156 All the above provisions are to some extent incompliance 
with the standards of OECD Principles III.  
 
However, since providing adequate basic ownership rights of shareholders are prerequisite 
for incentivizing boards to improve the company’s efficiency and solid financial markets, the 
current share company law provisions should be strengthened. It should prescribe additional 
ex-ante and ex-post provisions that enhance the equitable treatments of shareholders and the 
protection of minority shareholders. In these case, shareholders voting rights should be 
extended by mail, custodian or nominee of shares (OECD Principles III, A (3and5) of 
Annotations. The share company law under article 401 also stipulated another hindrance that 
compels shareholders to deposit their shares before the general meetings. This requirement 
has two disadvantages. First, it imposes unduly impediments to shareholders to cast votes. 
Second, it has the potential means for controlling shareholders to block minority shareholders 
from selling their shares for certain days.157   
   
The main challenges in public companies corporate governance is the misuse of companies’ 
assets by majority shareholders to the detriment of minority shareholders and the 
company.158In this case, the share company law provisions had loopholes. It failed to 
adequately protect minority shareholders from corporate insiders and abusive self-dealings by 
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or in the interests of majority shareholders directly or indirectly. Abusive self-dealings and 
insider trading by controlling shareholders can be exercised in the forms of electing their 
family or friends in board members, participating in related party transactions, pursuing 
personal and political agendas at shareholders meetings and extracting the profits of 
subsidiary companies in pyramid business structures.159 Such activities of controlling 
shareholders are identified as impediments of the development of capital and financial 
markets.  As a result, the OECD Principles III (B) called for policy makers to prohibit such 
activities and fill the gaps. Hence, the share company law has to provide legal protections to 
minority shareholders in two ways. In one hand, impose fiduciary duties on controlling 
shareholders. On the other hand, require review of their transactions with the company by 
independent directors coupled with full disclosure and faire accounting treatments.160 
 
The share company law prohibits directors’ loans and any business transaction with the 
company directly or indirectly requires a prior approval of boards and auditors notice.  
However, it neglected to include the general managers.  Especially, the gaps become apparent 
when as per article 348(3) of the commercial code the general managers are not members of 
the boards. Consequently, by using this loophole, general managers may abusively transact 
with the company without disclosure and subject to prior approval of boards. It also missed to 
cover the director’s transactions with the company on behalf of third parties and their 
families. These loopholes are not only detrimental to minority shareholders but also to the 
whole shareholders and the company. Similarly, the share company law failed to provide to 
minority shareholders rights to derivative actions against the directors or controlling 
shareholders resolutions or third parties on behalf of the company once they have reasonable 
ground to believe that their rights are violated (OECD Principles III, A (2) Annotation). 
Contrarily, article 365(3) of the commercial code blocked minority shareholders right to 
institute proceedings against the liable directors where one fifth of share capitals of 
shareholders vote against the resolution.  
 
Finally, Fekadu Petros also clearly demonstrated the inadequacies of minority shareholder 
protections under the share company law. He took five criteria adopted by authors La-Porta, 
Lopez-de, Shleifer and Vishny and six criteria adopted by author Pistor’s. After evaluated the 
                                                     
159 Chen, Li and Shapiro (n145) 116.  
160 OECD: ‘Related Party Transactions and Minority Shareholder Right’ (2012) 27 OECD Publishing at 
<http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264168008-en >last accessed 28July 2012. 
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two different criteria developed by those authors one by one corresponding with the relevant 
share company law provisions, he concluded that the level of minority shareholder 
protections under the Ethiopian share company law only comply with two of both the five 
and six criteria.161 
 
 
3.4 Addressing the Interests and Roles of Stakeholders within the Share Company 
 
As noted previously, corporate governance framework integrates private voluntary internal 
governance of the company and mandatory regulations of external governance of the 
company. Both internal and external governance framework intends to ensure the effective 
functioning of companies in the creations of wealth by minimizing costs. To attain these 
corporate objectives, there are two long lasting debates by legal scholars and policy makers in 
shaping the structure of corporate governance framework and the roles of companies. These 
debates are “shareholders’ primacy approach an Anglo- American model” in one hand and 
“stakeholders’ primacy approaches Germany and Japanese corporate governance models” on 
the other hand. Berle, one of the leading proponents of the first approach dictated that boards 
and companies managers should direct the company for the sole interests of maximizing 
shareholders profit by disregarding the interests of stakeholders.162 On the other hand, Dodd 
proponents of the second approach contended that boards should direct the company not only 
for the interests of shareholders but also for the interests of various stakeholders who make 
“firm specific investments” within the company.163 In the second models, bank creditors and 
employees are entitled to represent in board members and other stakeholders have also an 
influential voice in the governance of the company.  
 
However, through time these two contending approaches converge into another theory called 
an “enlightened shareholders value” approach. According to this approach, for the long term 
profit maximization of shareholders and sustainability of the company, the decisions of the 
board should align the interest of shareholders profit maximization with the interest of 
                                                     
161 Petros (n7) 16-22. 
162 Adolf A. Berle, ‘Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust’ (1931) 44 (7) Harvard Law Review 1049. 
163 E. Merrick Dodd, “For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustee?” (1932) 45(7) Harvard Law Review 1145, 
1149; Janis Sarrat, ‘Governance versus Divergence, Global Corporate Governance at the Crossroads: 
Governance Norms, Capital Markets & OECD Principles for Corporate Governance’ (2002) 33 Ottawa Law 
Review 177, 196-20; Luka, (n 20) 5-7. 
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stakeholders.164 Recently, this approach is to some extent reflected even in the “Anglo-
American corporate governance model.” For instance, in United States more than 25 States 
enacted “constituency statutes” which permit boards to take into account the concerns of 
stakeholders in their decisions.165 Similarly, the United Kingdom Companies Act requires 
boards to promote the interests of stakeholders.166 However, in both cases their statutes failed 
to clearly articulate stakeholders substantive and procedural enforceable rights in the 
corporate governance of the company.  
 
Similarly, the OECD Principles discussed in part two apparently takes the position of the 
“enlightened shareholders Value” approach. They recommended corporate governance 
frameworks should address the interests of stakeholders provided by laws and contracts.  
Once national laws and contractual agreements addressed stakeholders’ interests, they should 
obtain all reliable and material information timely and regularly in order to proactively 
participate in company’s corporate governance process. In case where their rights are 
violated, they should be fully compensated. The principles particularly emphasised that to 
enhance companies’ performances, employees should be allowed to engage in the corporate 
governance of the company. Participation of employees may vary board member 
representations or consulting representatives of workers council on core company decisions 
or participate in the company’s shares or profits depending on national laws. The principles 
further advocate corporate governance frameworks are expected to have effective and 
efficient insolvency laws and robust enforcement of creditors’ rights. 
 
From these analyses and part one discussions, the share company law provisions ostensibly 
adopted the traditional “Anglo- American models” of corporate governance of shareholders’ 
primacy approach. As a result, it entirely disregarded the interests of stakeholders within the 
company except rights of creditors. Only company’s creditors are permitted in certain 
circumstances to participate and vote in meetings called by their representative, company’s 
directors or by 20% of debt holders on matters related to the effective enforcement of their 
                                                     
164 Virginia Harper Ho, ‘“Enlightened Shareholders Value”: Corporate Governance Beyond the Shareholders 
and Stakeholders Divide’ (2010) 36 J Cop L 59, 62. 
165 Sarrat (n163) 216.  
166 Companies Act of 2006(UK) Sections 172(1) provides companies’ directors have the responsibility to 
promote the interests of employees, customers, suppliers and companies operations affect on the community and 
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rights on debtor companies.167 Correspondingly, companies’ directors are liable to creditors 
under article 366(1) when they failed to preserve the assets of the company. Under articles 
362, 363 and 364 of the commercial code, directors are only accountability to the laws, 
shareholders and the company. These provisions entirely disregard and failed to address the 
interests of employees, suppliers, customers, the community and environments as a whole 
required by the current United Kingdom Companies Act of 2006 and OECD Principles IV.  
 
Here, one may argues that as long as directors are accountable to the company and the law, 
the interests of stakeholders are recognized under the share company law impliedly. 
Nevertheless, it is undeniable that with the exception of creditors, other stakeholders have no 
recognized substantive or procedural enforceable rights in the share company provisions. 
Unless stakeholders’ interests are addressed and their roles of engagement are clearly 
articulated, they may not claim to engage in the corporate governance of the company. In 
particular, employees and other stakeholders should be allowed to communicate with boards 
when there are malpractices within the company. It is obvious that malpractices by company 
managers not only detrimental to stakeholders and the company but also have potential risk to 
an overall country’s financial soundness and economic developments.  
 
In contrast, article 5 of the Ethiopian National Bank Directives unequivocally prohibited bank 
employees from board members representation.168 From this, it is reasonable to infer that the 
policy objective of Ethiopian corporate governance framework declines to address the 
interests and roles of stakeholders in the corporate governance of the company. At least the 
Directive should allow companies to determine whether or not employees are allowed to be 
represented at board members. Conversely, such clear prohibition will have disincentive for 
employees to apply their human capitals in the banking companies.  
 
Since cooperation between stakeholders and companies are important to generate wealth, jobs 
and long run sustainability of companies in the country, the share company law should 
address the interest of stakeholders. More importantly, Ethiopian companies are 
unsophisticated, labour intensive and lacks credit access. As a result, addressing stakeholders’ 
interests and promoting their active cooperation with the company will be essential for the 
                                                     
167 Commercial Code (n 66-68). 
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long term shareholders profit maximization and companies’ financial sustainability. On the 
other hand, the long term shareholders profit maximization and companies’ financial 
sustainability would be at risk unless the share company law provisions adequately address 
stakeholders’ interests within the company. 
 
 
3.5 Require Minimum Disclosure and Transparency Standards 
 
Companies’ transparency is among the four pillars of corporate governance.169 It requires 
timely disclosures of all relevant and accurate information that reflects the “true and faire 
view” of the company’s financial position and corporate governance. Disclosure 
requirements comprise both mandatory laws and voluntary codes. In both cases, a strong 
corporate disclosure regime will have three advantages. First, it enhances companies’ 
transparency. Second, it enables shareholders to make informed decisions and to monitor 
boards’ stewardship towards the company and themselves. Third, it serves as main tools for 
regulators to supervise and control corporate malpractices for the protection of investors and 
avoiding market inefficiencies. Therefore, a strong disclosure corporate governance 
framework assists to attract capitals and foster investors’ confidence on the capital markets 
whereas poor and inadequate corporate disclosure deter the proper functioning of capital 
markets, raise costs of capitals and result in poor allocations of resources.170  
 
In Ethiopian corporate governance framework context, disclosure and the transparency of 
companies are neglected and almost impossible at the current situation.171 The share company 
law provisions discussed in part one failed to clearly articulate the minimum standards of 
companies ‘disclosure of all relevant and reliable financial and non financial information 
timely and regularly. In addition, there are no other mandatory or voluntary disclosure 
standards in the country.  
 
Financial and non financial disclosure requirements in the share company law provisions 
noted in part one is insufficient and defective. The financial disclosure requirements provided 
under 419(1), 446, 447 and 448 of the commercial code failed to comply with international 
                                                     
169 Clarke (n 89) 245. 
170Jeans Jacques Du Plessis, Anil Hargovan and Mirko Bagaric, Principles of Contemporary Corporate 
Governance (2nd edn Cambridge University Press, New York 2011) 341-342.   
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financial reporting standards and best practices (OECD Principles V (B&C)). The financial 
reports required by these provisions only cover balance sheets and profit and loss accounts. 
They neglected other important components of financial reports (companies’ cash flows and 
income statements, and any equity changes, recognized gains or losses statement).172 
Moreover, the share company law provisions had loopholes to require auditors to apply 
established accounting and auditing rules and standards. It also failed to require 
independently audited financial reports. Further, even company’s auditors have no 
established accounting and auditing rules and standards in the country to apply in their 
auditing functions.173 Unless independently audited and prepared based on established 
accounting and auditing rules and standards, it is hardly possible to expect that the financial 
statements truly and fairly represents the company’s financial position and performance.  
 
Similarly, non financial disclosures are very limited and only included publishing the name, 
nature, capitals, head office and the place of the meetings in the commercial newspaper as per 
articles 392(1) and 396 of the commercial code. However, as noted in part one, these 
disclosure requirements are not applicable when all shareholders are registered shareholders. 
The disclosure of shareholdings between parent and subsidiary companies as per article 344 
of the commercial code and disclosure of companies directors’ civil status, professions and 
their directorship to other companies as per article 359 of the commercial code. These non 
financial disclosure provisions missed the basic elements of disclosure standards. These 
includes, companies’ ownership structure and voting rights, related parties’ transactions, 
companies’ objectives and potential risk factors, corporate governance structures, procedures 
and policies and how they are implemented (OECD Principles V, (A)2-8)). Such disclosures 
are vital for investors to decide whether or not to invest in a particular company. More 
severely, there is no channel of disseminating even these limited companies’ information to 
the public. Rather, they are kept in the companies or the registrars of the Ministry of Trade. 
So there is a complete information asymmetry between investors and companies in the 
current corporate governance framework of Ethiopia. Thus, there should be minimum 
mandatory and voluntary disclosure standards requirements that do not burdensome to the 
companies or endanger their competitiveness in the markets.    
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173 ibid 12. 
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3.6 Expand the Duties and Responsibilities of Boards and Auditors  
 
As discussed in part two, boards have given three broad responsibilities in the governance of 
the company. They are responsible to strategically directing the company, overseeing of 
managements and stewardship towards the shareholders and the company. In doing so, their 
composition and structures may be one tier, two tiers or additional statutory board structure. 
In terms of board member compositions, the share company law contains controversial 
provisions. There may be three types of board structures under the share company law. First, 
article 348 (3&4) of the commercial code clearly stipulated that the general manager is an 
employee of the company and may not be members of the boards. Therefore, in this case all 
board members become none-executive. Second, article 363(2) of the commercial code 
provides that the articles of association should determine whether all boards or one/more 
board member are managers of the company. In this provision, there will be two possible 
board structures. In one hand, in case where the articles of association assign all board 
members to be managers of the company, all the boards’ composition become executive 
directors. On the other hand, in case where the articles of association only specifies one/more 
directors as manager of company, the rest of board members are non executives and the 
composition becomes executive and non- executive boards. Thus, the two provisions seem to 
contradict and needs to harmony to avoid confusion. Especially, it will be more difficult for 
boards to make objective and independent judgement when all boards are assigned by articles 
of association as managers of the company pursuant to article 363(2) of the commercial code. 
  
Accountability of boards is among the four pillars of corporate governance and hence they 
are required to effectively overseeing managements and accountable to shareholders and the 
company.174 As noted above, boards have two fiduciary duties while discharging their 
responsibilities: “duty of care and duty of loyalty.” Duty of care refers the possible best 
performance of boards in the discharging of their duties entrusted on them whereas “duty of 
loyalty and faire dealings” refers the supremacy and prevailing of the interests of 
shareholders over the boards.175 Boards of directors not only under article 364 (3) have a 
general duty to perform with due care in overseeing the managements of the company but 
also they have the responsibility to demonstrate that they are acting with due diligence and 
                                                     
174 Clarke (n89) 245. 
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care as per article 364 (5) of the commercial code. Hence, in this case the share company law 
is in compliance with OECD Principle V (A). However, the relevant requirements of act in 
fully informed and a bona fide basis are missed. Both these to requirements are crucial for 
boards to discharge their duties with “due care and diligence,” especially those boards who 
are not executive members. In the absence of fully informed basis, it would be difficult for 
boards to act upon with “due care and diligence.”  
 
As discussed in part one, article 358 of the commercial code requires boards decisions must 
be taken with an absolute majority. Nonetheless, this article only provides the quantitative 
and missed the qualitative requirements of board decisions. Since the decisions of the board 
may affect different classes of shareholders, they should make objective and independent 
judgments which align the interests of all shareholders with the stakeholders (OECD 
Principles VI, (B&C)). So in this case, the share company law should make clear that board 
decisions must be not only absolute majority but also treat all shareholders equitably and take 
into account the interest of companies’ stakeholders. Act in due care and deal in fairly 
(loyalty) also requires boards to establish and apply ethical standards in the company. In this 
regard, the share company law provisions ignore to prescribe requirements of boards to adopt 
an appropriate ethical code of conduct to evaluate their own acts and companies managers.   
 
The core functions of directors discussed under article 362 (a-g) of the commercial code are 
more procedural and neglected substantive duties and functions of boards. This provision 
failed to prescribe how boards strategically direct, review companies risks policy, overseeing 
managements and the effective compliance of the company’s governance practices. It also 
failed to set out their roles in nomination and election of board members; supervising and 
managing conflicts of interests with the company and corporate insiders, and monitoring 
company’s disclosures (OECD Principles VI, D).  
 
Even though article 361(1) of the commercial code requires boards’ balance sheet to clearly 
show the total amount of remuneration, it failed to align with long run interests of 
shareholders and the company. Unless boards’ remuneration policy shows such alignment, 
shareholders may not properly determine the boards’ remuneration. Similarly the share 
company law failed to state how managers’ remuneration is determined. Especially, as per 
article 348(3 and 4) of the commercial code managers are outside board members, failing 
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clearly articulate may have potential impacts on the company’s transparency and may result 
in managers corporate abuse.  
 
Key functions of boards to review related parties transactions other than directors are not 
stated in the share company law provisions.176 Needles to say, the accounts and books 
prepared under 362 (b & c) of the commercial code are not audited by independent auditor 
and failed to comply with the international financial reporting standards. Without accounting 
and auditing standards and independent auditor, it would be difficult for directors to ensure 
the integrity of the company’s accounts and financial reporting systems.   
 
Independent and objective judgements in corporate affairs are essential elements for boards’ 
stewardship towards shareholders and the company. To deliver independent and objective 
judgements and avoid conflicts of interests, the existence of non-executive and independent 
board members in the company is crucial. In this case, the separation of chairman man of 
boards and manager pursuant to 348(1&3)) of the commercial code is one step. However, as 
illustrated in the above paragraph, there is the possibility that all board members are 
executive directors as per article 363(2) of the commercial code. In such case, there will be 
apparent conflicts of interests when executive boards review their own transactions with the 
company pursuant to article 356 of the commercial code. Board members are collectively 
responsible to exercise their duties and responsibilities according to the law, the company’s 
statutes and resolutions of shareholders meeting under article 364(1) of the commercial code. 
This provision imposes on boards’ cumulative responsibility though they may act 
individually.177 
 
In the case of auditors, the share company law has two drastic loopholes. First, it failed to 
require auditors to carry out their accounting and auditing functions based on established 
rules of accounting and auditing standards. Second, it failed to require minimum qualification 
to be eligible an auditor or holding a practicing license issued in accordance with the 
regulations of the country’s accountancy professions. Finally, the share company law also 
failed to provide boards and auditors liability of failures to observe the sated accounting, 
auditing and financial reporting 
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Part Four 
Conclusion and Recommendations 
 
It is undeniable that formulating and establishing appropriate and effective legal, regulatory 
and institutional framework are a prerequisite for good corporate governance in Ethiopia. The 
existence of good corporate governance framework within the country will not only foster 
market integrity, improves economic efficiency and development but also builds investor 
confidence. As the share company law is one of the major components of corporate structure 
of the country, this dissertation critically analyzed whether the Ethiopian share company law 
envisaged such outcomes or not in light of the six minimum standards of OECD Principles of 
corporate governance. The findings of this dissertation demonstrated that the Ethiopian share 
company law legal and regulatory framework apparently failed to intend to achieve these 
outcomes. Rather, the legal and regulatory framework of the share company law provisions 
lagged far behind from the new markets development and concerns of complex corporate 
governance issues. The government of Ethiopia has also already recognized the inadequacy 
of the entire commercial code and committed to draft a new one.  
 
Hence, formulating an appropriate and efficient share company law that reflects the modern 
business realities and accommodates the demands of different market players in the country 
is very importance. As noted above, the OECD Principles of corporate governance will have 
relevancy to improve the legal, regulatory and institutional framework of Ethiopian corporate 
governance by taking into account its national legal, economic and business practices. 
Therefore, to update the share company law provisions with the modern markets 
development and concerns of complex corporate governance issues, this dissertation 
advocated that consulting the relevant OECD Principles of corporate governance as a 
reference and benchmark is worthwhile. It also recommends that the identified gaps and 
shortcomings of the share company law provisions should be rectified during the drafting of 
the new commercial code.  
  
This dissertation depicted that the requirements of minimum capitals and shareholders 
membership to form share companies have no relevance to protect shareholders or creditors. 
Rather, they will discourage pools of new capital investments; consequently these two 
provisions should be revised. It also identified that the requirements to incorporate or increase 
40 
 
the capital of share companies through the offering of equity or debt securities to the public 
have three major loopholes. First, the financial reports incorporated in the initial prospectus 
offered to the public neither incorporate auditor’s opinions nor approved and registered by 
Ministry of Trade. Secondly, in the offering of additional equity or debt securities, the 
provisions failed to require the prospectus to include independently audited financial reports. 
Thirdly, there is no provision that makes founders or issuers liable when the prospectus 
offered to the public contained misleading or inaccurate statements or omitted the relevant 
information. Thus, to protect investors and avoid markets inefficiencies all these gaps should 
be filled.  
 
In addition, the share company law legal framework should also require supplementary laws 
and regulations, including voluntary codes and standards. Illiquidity of shares and lacks of 
credit accesses in the capital markets are the main challenge for Ethiopian share companies. 
In this regard, allowing the establishment of stock exchanges and alternative trading systems 
will have crucial roles. Without stock exchanges and alternative trading systems, there will 
not be strong capital markets within the country. The share company law should also allocate 
adequate and sufficient regulatory and supervisory powers to regulators. Thus, besides to the 
Ministry of Trade, there should be clear allocation of regulatory and supervisory powers 
among government and private agencies subject to avoiding over regulation and conflict of 
powers.    
 
With regard to the basic ownership rights of shareholders, allowing companies to issue bearer 
shares have three identified disadvantages. First, it failed to confer secured shareholders 
ownership rights. Second, it deters companies’ transparency. Third, this may lead to evasion 
of government taxes and abuse of company’s assets by mangers. Thus, article 325 of the 
commercial code needs to be rectified. This dissertation also suggested that shareholders right 
to information provided in the share company law is inadequate and should to be revised. 
Especially, shareholders should have the right to be informed about the voting procedure, the 
agenda and the issues to be decided before they participate and vote at the meeting. Similarly, 
article 397(2) of the commercial code that prohibits shareholders to put in place items in the 
agenda at shareholders meetings should be avoided. Instead, they should be promoted to ask 
questions, forward issues to put in place on the agenda and propose resolutions subject to 
certain limitations to prevent abuses. Shareholders right to vote in proxy should also include 
voting via E-mail. Since voting restrictions of shareholders diminish control ownership and 
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disincentive to participate in shareholders meetings, such provisions should be liberalized as 
much as possible. It would be advisable not to impose restrictions more than half of the share 
capitals of the company. Therefore, make it clear that at least half of the capitals of the 
company’s shares should be ordinary shares. Moreover, restricting free transfers of shares in 
public company impedes liquidity of the company’s shares in the capital markets. As a result, 
article 333 of the commercial code should be deleted. To make enforceable shareholders right 
to exit provided in article 364 of the commercial code, introducing stock markets and 
prescribing additional mandatory takeover provisions would be very crucial. 
 
To protect minority shareholders from corporate insiders, the share company law should 
clearly prohibit direct or indirect insider trading and abusive self-dealings within the 
company, including controlling shareholders. In this case, two mechanisms can be devised.  
First, transactions between controlling shareholders or/and managers and the company should 
be reviewed by non-executive boards. Second, provisions can be made that impose a 
fiduciary duty on controlling shareholders. Cumulative voting rights of minority shareholders 
provided under article 352 of the commercial code is vague and unclear; consequently it 
should explicitly refer each class of shareholders. Compelling shareholders to deposit their 
shares before the meetings of shareholders has the potential to block minority shareholders 
from selling their shares for certain days. Hence, article 401 of the commercial code should 
be relaxed to the extent possible. Likewise, article 365(3) of the commercial code that 
restricts minority shareholders right to institute proceedings against liable directors should be 
avoided. Rather, minority shareholders should be allowed the right to derivative actions when 
they have a reasonable ground that their rights are violated. Nonetheless, devising appropriate 
mechanisms should be made to prevent using of such rights for abusive purpose.  
 
Since stakeholders are an integral parts of company’s capital resource, clearly addressing 
their interests and roles within the company will improve the financial sustainability of the 
company and the development of the economy. In this regard, the share company law should 
at least require the accountability of boards to the interests of employees, creditors, suppliers, 
customers, the community and the environment as a whole. To the extent possible, provisions 
may also be made that permit companies employees to engage in the corporate governance of 
the company.   
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Regarding companies disclosure and transparency, poor disclosure regime deters effective 
functioning of capital markets, raises costs of capital and result in poor allocations of 
resources. As a result, the financial disclosure provided in the share company law should 
include companies’ cash flows and income statements, and statements of any equity changes 
and recognized gains or losses. The financial reports should also be prepared based on 
established accounting and auditing standards and be audited by independent auditor. 
Equally, minimum mandatory and voluntary non-financial public disclosures should be 
provided. Especially, companies’ ownership structures and voting rights, related parties’ 
transactions, companies’ objectives and potential risk factors, and the company’s corporate 
governance structure are very importance. 
 
With regard to boards, the contradicted provisions of articles 348(3&4) and 362(2) of the 
commercial code that prescribe the compositions of boards should be harmonized. Since 
allowing companies’ statutes to assign all board members as managers of the company will 
make boards incompetent to deliver independent and objective judgments, it should be 
rectified. Boards decisions provided under article 358 of the commercial code should also 
qualify objective and independent judgments for equal treatments of all classes of 
shareholders. The provisions of boards’ duties, functions and liabilities set out in articles 362, 
363 and 364 of the commercial code should clearly articulate how boards strategically direct 
and review companies risk policy; supervise managements and controls conflict of interests. 
It should also provide how companies’ managers are remunerated and compensated.  
 
Boards’ review of related parties’ transaction with the company should extend to managers 
and controlling shareholders. For this, boards should be required to apply an appropriate 
ethical code of conduct to evaluate their own acts and control managements. The boards’ 
books and accounts should also clearly show that the financial reports are prepared according 
to established accounting and auditing standards and audited by independent auditor.  
 
Regarding auditors, the share company law should require auditors to carry out their auditing 
functions based on established accounting and auditing rules and standards. It should also 
prescribe the minimum qualification to be eligible an auditor or holding a practicing license 
issued according to the regulations of country’s accountancy professions. Finally, the share 
company law should stipulate applicable penalties on boards and auditors who failed to 
observe accounting, auditing and financial reporting standards.    
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